


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19 July 1963



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SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

ARGENTINE ELECTIONS MARK NEW ERA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MORI/CDF Pages 1-6 and 8

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19 July 1963

ARGENTINE ELECTIONS MARK NEW ERA

In the general elections on 7 July, Argentines cast an overwhelming vote for the center and rejected extremist elements who tried to forestall the return to representative government. The results seriously damaged the political power of Peron and ex-President Frondizi, whose collaborative activity has been a major cause of the political crisis that has gripped the country for months. The shift in votes favored the presidential candidacies of Dr. Arturo Illia (pronounced eel-yee-ah) of the People's Radical Civic Union (UCRP) and of retired General Pedro Aramburu. Since neither obtained a majority, the outcome will be decided in the electoral college on 31 July. The election results will in general encourage UCRP cooperation with the Intransigent Radicals (UCRI), whose presidential candidate, Oscar Alende, has already indicated his desire to swing his supporters to Illia.

The UCRP plurality came to only 25 percent of the total vote cast, but this amounts to almost a mandate in the circumstances and points to a victory for Illia in the electoral college--unless Aramburu can draw off a sizable number of UCRI electors not responsive to Alende. The general public and the armed forces appear highly gratified that the elections came off peacefully, and that the Peronist stratagem of casting blank ballots was a failure. The UCRP probably gained some UCRI and Peronist votes in the presidential race and probably lost some supporters to the Argentine People's Union (UDELPA), a new center party formed to promote the candidacy of General Aramburu.

The left-of-center UCRP's appeal to support from outside its own ranks derived from its nationalistic platform, which

probably attracted some labor votes, and the noncontroversial character of Dr. Illia, its presidential candidate. The UCRP has vowed to annul petroleum contracts--many with US companies--which ex-President Frondizi negotiated to help develop oil resources. Illia has endorsed this stand, but one of his close colleagues has explained that the UCRP objection is partly legalistic and based on the lack of congressional approval of the contracts. He expects that the contracts will be renegotiated and submitted to a special session of congress soon after the new government takes office on 12 October.

Illia, a practicing physician almost 63 years old, is highly regarded for his political integrity, even by opposition leaders. Until the recent

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ELECTORAL TIMETABLE

7 July	Election of presidential and gubernatorial electors, national deputies, provincial and municipal officials.
29 July	Provincial legislatures elect national senators.
31 July	Presidential electors cast votes for president and vice president.
12 August	National congress verifies count of electoral college and, if no candidate received a majority, elects president and vice president.
26 August	Provincial electoral colleges choose governors and vice governors.
12 October	Inauguration of new government.

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

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SECRET**ILLIA**

campaign, he had concentrated his political activities in central Cordoba Province.

Illia has long advocated reunification of the UCRP and the UCRI, which split in 1957 over the issue of Frondizi's leadership. The URCI national committee is now making overtures in this direction and has resolved to ask the UCRI convention on 26 July to support UCRP candidates in the electoral colleges which will elect the president on 31 July and 22 governors on 26 August. Reunification, however, appears to be a future, rather than immediate, goal.

Aramburu is trying to negotiate for some of the crucial UCRI electoral votes, despite the apparent Illia bandwagon, which has been joined by the Christian Democrats. Reflecting his centrist stand, he has other feelers out to the Demo-

**ALENDE****ARAMBURU**

cratic Socialists and neo-Peronists as well as the important Federation of Center Parties. Aramburu, provisional president from 1955 to 1958, is highly regarded for his honesty and for guaranteeing the return to constitutional government in 1958.

The Role of the Peronists

Peron's last-minute campaign tactic was to order the Peronists' Popular Union (UP) party to withdraw from the elections, but various neo-Peronist and pro-Peronist parties failed to follow the order and in fact participated, thereby contributing to the split within the Peronist movement. The neo-Peronists and pro-Peronists appear to have won at least 25 seats in the presidential electoral college and 18 out of 192 seats in the national chamber of deputies, pending verification of the

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FIRST OFFICIAL RETURNS*

PARTY	POPULAR VOTE (%)	ELECTORAL VOTE
UCRP	2,394,192 (25.0)	169
UCRI	1,557,653 (16.3)	103
ARAMBURU	1,349,913 (14.8)	75
**BLANK	1,429,349 (15.0)	---
FEDERATION OF CENTER PARTIES	514,953 (5.4)	29
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS	429,801 (4.8)	28

*The official recount began on 11 July and may vary slightly from these returns.

** Mainly Peronist but includes usual 3-5% blank vote.

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
final official count. Some neo-Peronists will probably be elected to the national senate by the provincial legislatures; it is expected that the composition of the senate will closely resemble that of the national chamber.

Two key factors--which will complicate the new government's task--mainly explain the political turmoil which marked the election campaign and which has

plagued Argentina since Peron's ouster in 1955. The first is the fragmentation of political parties--69 distinct parties competed on 7 July. The second is the poverty of political party leadership in Argentina, a legacy from Peron's 12-year rule which prohibited a free press and stunted political expression.

From 1955 until the recent elections, the three largest political groupings in the country have been the UCRI, the UCRP, and the Peronist factions. Each of these groupings has been able to win approximately one quarter of the popular vote in various elections. This situation has induced competition for the Peronist vote, which in 1958 gave Frondizi a landslide victory in the electoral college.

The many crises over the Peronists, and over Frondizi's collaboration with them, have stemmed directly from the statements and actions of those Peronist leaders under Peron's orders. These opportunistic leaders have betrayed



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the Peronist rank and file by favoring Peron at the expense of the Peronist movement. All of the top spokesmen for the Peronist party have at one time or another called for Peron's return, despite the fact that the majority of Argentines clearly reject a return of his dictatorship and that the armed forces would not permit it.

The Peronist Outlook

The results of the election appear to have thrown the Peronist movement into disarray. Peron's personal influence has been sharply cut. This will encourage more Peronists to look to the neo-Peronist parties, which have never been consistently responsive to him, for leadership. This pattern, however, may take some time to emerge, partly because Peron deliberately undermined the development of recognized leadership in the movement that might compete with him.

The movement realizes it must adjust to a new situation. The Peronist coordinating council is planning to reorganize, although it--like the Peronist labor leadership--has not yet decided what specific steps to take. The basis of Peronist strength is in organized labor, and mainly in the Peronist labor organization--the "62 Group Unions." Hoping to exploit the present confusion, some "62" elements are reportedly discussing cooperation with Communist labor groups.

Andres Framini, a top Peronist labor leader, has continued to press for civil war, which suggests that he and other extremist elements will persist in subversive efforts. His attitude, however, is clearly out of tune with the current mood in the Peronist movement and in the country at large. (SECRET)

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